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The influence of group membership on individual behavior has attracted attention recently, because it questions economic theories that regard individual behavior as solely determined at the individual level. Largely inspired by George A. Akerlof's and Rachel E. Kranton's (2000) model on the effects of identity on economic outcomes, experimental economists have become increasingly interested in examining the effects of group identity on individual behavior. Gary Charness, Luca Rigotti and Aldo Rustichini (2007b) have found that salient group membership makes subjects more aggressive in coordination and prisoner's dilemma games. Saliency has been induced by letting other group members observe individual behavior or by using payoff commonality. The latter means that an individual's decision has consequences for the payoffs of other group members, even though the other members can not influence the individual's decision. Charness et al. (2007b) argue that salient group membership lets individuals shift their decisions towards those that are more favorable for the group as a whole, meaning that individuals take into account the payoffs of other group members. Charness et al. (2007b) conclude as their paper's first, and foremost, lesson that "groups profoundly affect individual behavior in social situations" (p. 1350).
The main goal of this comment is to relate the effects of group membership on individual behavior to team decision making. I find in an investment experiment that individual decisions with salient group membership are indistinguishable in the aggregate from those made by unitary teams. This result bridges the gap between the emerging literature on group membership effects (e.g., Goette et al., 2006; Charness et al., 2007b; Charness and Matthew O. Jackson, forthcoming; Chen and Li, forthcoming) and the literature on team decision 1 Their statement is supported by several other recent studies that typically examine individual behavior towards members of an ingroup or an outgroup. Lorenz Goette, David Huffman and Stephan Meier (2006) , for instance, report that officers of the Swiss army are more cooperative in a prisoner's dilemma game towards members of their own platoon than those of other platoons. Yan Chen and Xin Li (forthcoming) -who provide an excellent survey of the literature on group identity -show that the degree of other-regarding social preferences in an allocation task is stronger towards members of an ingroup than towards outgroup members. Ernst Fehr, Helen Bernhard and Bettina Rockenbach (2008) study the behavior of 3-to 8-year old children in a simple allocation task and find that the differences in behavior towards ingroup or outgroup members develop in this life-span.
making (e.g., David J. Cooper and John H. Kagel, 2005; Charness, Edi Karni and Dan Levin, 2007a ) and provides further insights into the determinants of team decision making. A secondary aim of this paper is to show that the findings of Charness et al. (2007b) (Gary Bornstein and Ilan Yaniv, 1998) , send or return smaller amounts in the trust game (James C. Cox, 2002; Tamar Kugler et al., 2007) , and are more selfish in dictator 2 One implication of my finding is that it potentially challenges some well-known and widely accepted theories in social psychology that rely on a distinction between ingroup and outgroup to explain individual behavior in groups (see, for example, the optimal distinctiveness model of Marilynn B. Brewer, 1991, or the social identity theory of Henri Tajfel and John Turner, 1979) . Exploring this implication in more detail is beyond the scope of this comment, though.
3 Team decision making is often referred to as "group decision making" in the literature. However, in order to separate more clearly between group membership in the spirit of Charness et al. (2007b) and team decisions, I will use the term "team" for situations in which several subjects have to agree on a joint decision, and the term "group membership" for situations in which individuals make decisions independently of others, but are somehow related to others, for example by being observed by others or by the prevalence of payoff commonality.
games (Wolfgang J. Luhan, Martin G. Kocher and Matthias Sutter, forthcoming) . 4 Teams exit the centipede game at earlier stages (Bornstein, Kugler and Anthony Ziegelmeyer, 2004) , and they outperform individuals in beauty-contest games because they converge more quickly to the equilibrium (Kocher and Sutter, 2005) . Concerning non-strategic tasks, teams take more rational decisions in intellective tasks, such as the Wason selection task (Boris Maciejovsky and David V. Budescu, 2007) , they are more forward-looking in a non-interactive commonpool-resource game (Joris Gillet, Arthur Schram and Joep Sonnemans, 2007) , and they achieve a higher payoff/risk ratio in a portfolio selection task (Rockenbach, Abdolkarim Sadrieh and Barbara Mathauschek, 2007) . Charness et al. (2007a) also show that teams violate the principles of Bayesian updating less often than individuals do. Summarizing the evidence, teams can be considered more "rational players" (Bornstein and Yaniv, 1998) in a broad variety of strategic-and non-strategic tasks.
Of course, an important question is why differences between team decisions and individual decisions occur. Opening the "black box" of team decision making, Cooper and Kagel (2005) have analyzed the content of team members' dialogues. In their experiment, teams play a limit pricing game against another team. In this signaling game a market incumbent can signal his cost type to a potential entrant by choosing a particular output level.
Teams are found to act more strategically than individuals by choosing higher output levels in order to signal that market entry is not profitable. This latter aspect of team decision making is remarkably similar to the findings of Charness et al. (2007b) who have shown that salient group membership changes individual behavior in a direction that yields more favorable outcomes for the other group members.
Given this similarity, it seems straightforward to ask whether salient group membership influences individuals in such a way that individual decisions become similar to -and possibly indistinguishable from -decisions taken by teams. Neither Charness et al. (2007b) nor the existing literature on team decision making has examined this question, even though answering it will provide a link between these two hitherto unrelated strands of literature.
I will examine the relation between team decision making and individual decisions under salient group membership by running a simple investment experiment. The experiment is based on one treatment of a paper by Uri Gneezy and Jan Potters (1997) Finally, since I also find a profound effect of salient group membership on individual decisions in a non-strategic task without any outgroup, the results of Charness et al. (2007b) are obviously applicable beyond the domain of strategic games or tasks where an outgroup is involved.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the basic experimental design. Section II presents the experimental treatments and results and is divided into three subsections. Subsection A examines whether individuals and teams make different decisions in the experimental task. Subsection B tests the effects of salient group membership on individual decisions and compares them to those of team decision making. Subsection C then addresses the question whether also team membership (i.e., not only group membership) has an impact on individual decisions. Section III concludes the paper by summarizing the main findings and discussing their implications.
I. Basic Experimental Design
All treatments reported below rely on the basic design of Gneezy and Potters (1997) .
Subjects receive an endowment of 100 Euro-cents (i.e. 1€) in each out of 9 rounds. Then they have to choose in each round how much to invest in a lottery with the following properties:
With a probability of 1/3 the lottery returns two and a half times the invested amount X in addition to the initial endowment, yielding a round payoff of 100 + 2.5X Euro-cents. With a probability of 2/3 the invested amount is lost, yielding 100 -X Euro-cents as payoff. Such a lottery yields the highest expected value (of 116.67 Euro-cents) in case of a maximum investment of X = 100 Euro-cents. Subjects are informed at the end of each round about the lottery's outcome, the resulting payoff in this round and the accumulated payoffs up to the present round. Note that the maximum investment in each round is 100. That means that an endowment not invested in previous rounds can not be carried over to be invested in later rounds.
All experimental sessions were programmed with z-Tree (Urs Fischbacher, 2007 ) and conducted at the Max Planck Institute of Economics in Jena. Sessions lasted on average 40 minutes. A total of 358 students from the University of Jena participated in the experiment (using the software ORSEE by Ben Greiner, 2004, for recruitment) . No subject was allowed to participate in more than one session and all subjects were randomly assigned to any of the treatments described in the following section. Participants earned on average 12.2 € (including a show-up fee of 2 €).
II. Experimental Treatments and Results

A. Individual Versus Team Decisions
Treatments.⎯The treatment variable considered first is the type of decision maker being All experimental instructions are available as additional material on the journal's homepage. 7 All tests reported in this paper are two-sided. When teams are considered, the team decision of three subjects is treated as one independent observation. 8 Note that the relative ranking of earnings corresponds to the relative levels of investment here, but that earnings are not significantly different. The latter is due to a high variance in earnings because they depend Treatments.⎯In treatment PAY-COMM (N = 54 subjects) groups of three subjects each are formed. Subjects get labels as member 1, member 2, or member 3. Decisions are made subsequently and independently, with each member being responsible for three rounds. 10 I.e., member 1 decides in rounds 1-3. The other two members are informed about the decisions and the outcome of the lottery after each round, and they earn the same amount as member 1.
Member 2 decides for rounds 4-6, and member 3 for rounds 7-9, with the same information and payoff conditions as in rounds 1-3. Other than the payoff commonality, there is no interaction between the linked members, and members remain anonymous. The whole procedure is common knowledge to all members before member 1 starts making decisions.
9 Charness et al. (2007b) show that payoff commonality makes group membership salient. They also report that observation and feedback can make group membership salient. For the purpose of this paper -comparing individual behavior under group membership to team decisions -payoff commonality is most appropriate to induce saliency. 10 The feature of members making decisions for three rounds only is motivated by letting each member be responsible for one third of the decisions that real teams of three subjects make in TEAMS.
Treatment MESSAGE (N = 72 subjects) is identical to PAY-COMM, but adds the opportunity of sending non-binding messages. Members can write down on a sheet of paper suggestions for investments or any other message to their predecessors (i.e., members deciding earlier) or their successors (i.e. members deciding later). Thus, member 1 receives two separate sheets of paper with messages from member 2, respectively member 3, before member 1 can make decisions for rounds 1-3. After round 3, members 1 and 3 can send messages to member 2 who can then decide for rounds 4-6. Finally, member 3 gets messages from members 1 and 2 before making decisions in rounds 7-9. Information conditions concerning the lottery's outcome are as in PAY-COMM, i.e. all linked members get to know the outcome as soon as a given round is over. Note that anonymity is preserved in treatment MESSAGE by forbidding subjects to send messages that might reveal their identity. In case a subject had violated this rule, he or she would not have received any payment. Yet, all subjects adhered to preserving anonymity. Treatment MESSAGE offers an opportunity to classify the type of messages sent back and forth and how they affect investment levels. The coding has been done independently by two research assistants who later on jointly clarified diverging assessments. The three most frequently occurring messages are the following. Message M1 proposes to make high investments, because the expected payoff for all group members is maximized with the maximum investment of 100. This message can be found on 30 percent of the sheets used for sending messages. Receivers of message M1 seem to respond to it, since the average investment level of a receiver is significantly positively correlated with message M1 (r = 0.23; p < 0.05, Pearson correlation). Message M2 suggests investing little, because the probability of losing in a single round is double the one of winning in the lottery. This message is included on 18 percent of sheets, but it is not significantly correlated with actual investment levels chosen by the recipients of these messages (r = -0.08; p = 0.50). Message M3 recommends high investments, because the group can reasonably expect to win on average in 3 out of 9 rounds. It is used on 15 percent of sheets, but has no significant correlation with investment levels either (r = 0.09; p = 0.47). All other types of messages are rare. Some sheets also contain only a suggested investment level, without providing any reasoning for it. In sum, the most frequently used messages try to give information on what to do and to influence the recipient in the sender's favorite direction, and appeal to joint payoffs in the group.
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C. The Influence of Team Decision Making on Individual Decisions
The previous subsection has shown that group membership has an effect on individual decisions. Now I investigate whether the experience of team decision making (contrary to mere group membership where decisions are still taken independently from other subjects)
can also affect individual behavior. If this is to be found and the effects are similar to those reported in the previous subsection, this would corroborate the finding that both group membership -where individual decisions are taken independently from other subjects -and team decision making -which requires a joint decision of several team members -have largely similar effects on individual behavior.
Treatment.⎯The treatment MIXED (N = 84 subjects) intends to examine how the experience of team decision making affects individual decision making. In rounds 1-3, each 11 Of course, it would be very interesting to compare the messages used in MESSAGE with the content of communication in treatment TEAMS. Unfortunately, the communication in TEAMS has not been recorded (since teams sat in separate rooms). It seems clear, though, that messages M1 and M3 target the issue of how to maximize expected earnings from the experiment. This is also what has been found in an analysis of the videoprotocols of team communication in a signaling game (Sutter, forthcoming) , providing indirect support for the conjecture that in the experiment reported here the messages used in MESSAGE were probably similar to the arguments exchanged in TEAMS.
subject decides independently of all other members. Payoff commonality does not apply in these rounds, and group members are not informed about the decisions of the other members.
For rounds 4-6, however, three subjects are linked together to form a team. They are then connected via an electronic chat in which they can exchange any messages (that do not reveal their identity) in order to reach a team decision. Team decisions are only valid if all team members enter the same decision on their computer. Naturally, this means that in rounds 4-6 all group members earn the same amount of money since they make a team decision.
Participants are not informed at the beginning of the experiment about the need to make team decisions in rounds 4-6, but this is revealed only after round 3.
12 After round 6 it is announced that a final phase of individual decision making in rounds 7-9 (identical to rounds 1-3) completes the session. This final phase is important to examine the effects of team decision making on subsequent individual decisions. investments due to the high probability of losing -is voiced in 21 percent of teams, but has no significant effect on the investment levels. Neither has message M3, which advocates positive investments due to an expected number of 3 wins and which is found in 11 percent of teams.
III. Conclusion
In this comment I have used a non-strategic investment task to explore further the effects of salient group membership on individual behavior. Charness et al. (2007b) have shown that group membership changes individual behavior, making it more competitive in coordination games and prisoner's dilemma games. This paper adds to their findings in three important ways.
The first lesson from this paper is that the effects of salient group membership on individual behavior prevail also in a non-strategic task that has no outgroup. Consequently, without an outgroup. They have found that subjects make fewer errors in probability judgments, i.e., they are less prone to the conjunction fallacy when they can consult with others before making a decision.
The second, and most important, lesson from this paper is that team decision making has the same effects as salient group membership on individual decisions. This result is by no means trivial, because team decision making requires deliberation, compromise and consensus among team members, whereas salient group membership leaves the decision making power unconditionally with a single individual. Individual behavior under group membership does not require compromise or any other form of coordination with other group members. Hence, although both forms of decision making -in teams as well as individually with group membership -have distinctly different institutional structures, they yield decisions that are largely the same in the aggregate. An important qualification to this statement is to acknowledge the -in my view most interesting -finding of Charness et al. (2007b) that group membership has to be salient to affect individual behavior. Payoff commonality obviously satisfies this condition. In the strategic games of Charness et al. (2007b) and in my nonstrategic task payoff commonality has shifted individual decisions in a direction that is more favorable for the group as a whole, meaning that individuals wish to take actions that are expected to be good not only for themselves, but also for the other group members. 14,15 The same goal of achieving higher payoffs is also often invoked in the dialogues of team members (see Cooper and Kagel, 2005, or Sutter, 2008 , for evidence from signaling games, for instance). Hence, payoff commonality seems to be one driving force for individual behavior in groups, but also for team decision making. The second lesson therefore links two hitherto unrelated strands of literature, i.e. on group membership effects and on team decision making.
A third lesson from this paper is that the experience of team decision making also affects individual behavior. After having made decisions in a team, individual decisions are much closer to the previously taken team decisions than to the decisions that the same individuals have taken as individuals. This finding can be considered a robustness check for the second 14 If this wish determined individual behavior under salient group membership, then investing the full amount in order to maximize the expected payoff not only for oneself, but also for the linked members, should be more frequent in PAY-COMM and MESSAGE than in INDIVIDUALS. In fact, this is what I find, since the relative frequency of investing the full endowment (X = 100) is significantly higher both in PAY-COMM (18.5 percent) and in MESSAGE (36.6 percent) than in INDIVIDUALS (12.5 percent; p < 0.05 in both comparisons; χ²-tests).
15 Maximizing expected payoffs requires higher investments -and thus more exposure to risk -in my experiment. Charness and Jackson (forthcoming) find in a Stag Hunt game (which is a two-player coordination game) that individuals make less risky decisions when payoff commonality applies. Though this might seem conflicting evidence at first sight, both findings are compatible when considering the expected payoffs in the Stag Hunt game under the assumption that the opponent player chooses randomly. Taking the safe option "Hare" yields a sure payoff of 8 in the experiment of Charness and Jackson (forthcoming), irrespective of the other's choice. However, the risky option "Stag" has an expected payoff of 5 only (getting either 9 if the other player chooses also "Stag", or 1 if "Hare" is chosen by the other player). Thus, the results of Charness and Jackson (forthcoming) can be interpreted as subjects maximizing the expected payoff in the face of strategic uncertainty about the other player's behavior.
lesson. Therefore, the bottom line of this paper is that both salient group membership -where individual decisions are taken independently from other subjects -and team decision making -which requires a joint decision of several subjects -have largely the same effects on individual behavior.
